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RESPONSE TO THE CITY DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City Defendants' Statement of Facts is improper and should not be considered
by the Court for several reasons. First, it contains many facts that are irrelevant to the
issues before the Court. Second, it omits many facts that are material. Third, many of
the purported "facts" the City Defendants cite in support of its position are not supported
by the record. Fourth, it is filled with legal arguments and conclusions, not facts. The
Citizens address each of the objectionable facts separately below.
The City Defendants begin their Statement of Facts by offering background
information about how many users benefit from the electrical distribution system it seeks
to purchase, what the system is comprised of and the services the current distributor
provides to its users. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 6.) However interesting this
information may be, it is irrelevant to the issues before the Court. It does not establish or
disprove any element of any of the claims asserted. The only value this information could
possibly have would be to demonstrate how users of the system might benefit if the City
were to purchase it. It fails, however, to establish even this.
The City Defendants' own facts confirm the system's users will receive the power
and services they currently receive at the same rates regardless of whether the City owns
the system or not. The City Defendants state, "Engineers retained by the City projected
that by maintaining electric utility rates at their current levels the City could expect
annual net revenues averaging between $200,000 and $300,000 through the year 2019.
Alternatively, the City could substantially reduce electric utility rates for City residents."
1

(City Defendants' Brief, pg. 7.) According to this statement, the City Defendants could
not pay for the system and lower electric prices. They would have to make a choice.
Because they planned to finance the purchase with electric revenue bonds, (City
Defendants' Brief, pg. 10), which would have been funded by the system's yearly
revenues, (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 10 n.3), they could not lower prices.
Consequently, there is no evidence that users of the system would benefit if the City
purchased it. The City Defendants' assertions otherwise are contrary to the record and
should be disregarded.
The next objectionable assertion in the City Defendants' Statement of Facts is their
representation that "even after the appraiser issued its report and the parties agreed to a
base value of $1,315,271.00, the City and Empire Electric continued to dispute the final
purchase price." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 7.) First, it is irrelevant to the issues before
the court and wholly unsupported by the record. Second, there is nothing in the portion of
the record the City Defendants cite that establishes the purchase price was anything but
final. The City Defendants' own citation confirms the only dispute was over who would
be responsible for paying miscellaneous closing costs, separation costs, and fees
associated with the purchase, which have nothing to do with the price of the system. (R.
at 214). The falsity of the City Defendants' statement is supported by their own words,
where they stated in Resolution 2000-2, "[A] fair market value of $1,315,271 was agreed
upon between the parties . . . " and "the City will exercise the option of re-purchase of the
municipal electrical system from Empire Electric Association, for the established fair
2

market value of $1,315,271 . . . " (R. at 188.) Consequently, their assertion the price of
the system was not final is not supported by the record and should be disregarded.
The City Defendants claim in their Statement of Facts that during the time they
were evaluating the purchase, "the City administration did everything possible to
communicate facts to the public and to conduct Council deliberations as publicly as
possible." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 7.) They also state, "The City made tremendous
efforts to inform the public." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 8.) The only facts the City
Defendants produce to support these claims are in a footnote where they list the dates of
public meetings in which they claim to have discussed the proposed purchase, published
revenue projections and circulated a handbill explaining to the public the benefits of the
proposed purchase. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 8 n.l.)
These assertions are overcome, however, by the following facts, which are
explained in more detail in the Citizens' opening brief: 1) the City Defendants met in
closed sessions 16 times to discuss whether purchasing the system was feasible, whether
it would be good for the City, to ask the opinion of others on the subject, and to determine
how to present the information on whether or not to purchase the system to City residents
at scheduled public meetings (R. at 1049, pg. 6, J 25); 2) the minutes for most of those
meetings state the reason for closing them was to discuss strategies in purchasing the real
property of the system when the proposed purchase was actually for the entire system,
which included not only real property but equipment and other tangible and intangible
assets as well (R. at 124, ^ 27); 3) they discussed in those closed meetings not only the
3

supposed "purchase of real property," but also whether it was a good idea to purchase the
system at all, what challenges the City would face in owning its own electric distribution
system, the feasibility of the City undertaking such a burden and how to most favorably
present information about the proposed purchase to City residents; (R. at 1049, pgs. 6-7, ^j
27); 4) that one of the City Council members admitted there was no need to close the
sessions "because there was nobody going to bid against us" (R. at 1049, pg. 7, ^| 28); and
5) they misrepresented in the minutes what they discussed behind closed doors (R. at
1049, pgs. 6-7, Tf 27). These are the very reasons the trial court granted the Citizens'
motion on its Open and Public Meetings Act claim and ordered that the transcripts of
several of the closed meetings be revealed to the public. Both parties acknowledge this
ruling is not a subject of this appeal. Contrary to the City Defendants' assertion,
however, these facts are relevant to the issues before the Court because they demonstrate
how the City Defendants took repeated measures to keep the proposed purchase from the
voters, which is material to the referendum issue which is before the Court.
The City Defendants next accuse the current owner, Empire Electric, of initiating
the proposed referendum and funding this lawsuit for an improper purpose. They state
"Empire Electric is directly sponsoring, or at least encouraging, this litigation.
Employees of Empire Electric were involved in drafting and obtaining signatures for the
referendum petition, the litigation is at least partially funded by Empire Electric (or an
1

The City Defendants repeatedly argue they took all final action in public. While final decisions
were formally made in public meetings, they were informally analyzed and made beforehand behind
closed doors.
4

association to which it belongs), and Plaintiffs are represented by the same law firm that
has represented Empire Electric in negotiations regarding the repurchase. (R. 146, 941).
A reasonable inference from the facts is that Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit at the request
of Empire Electric." (City Defendants' Brief, pgs. 8-9.)
The Court should disregard these assertions for several reasons. First, there is no
support for them in the cited portions of the record, or anywhere in the record for that
matter, except that some of the people who helped write the petition seeking a referendum
and obtained signatures in support of it were employees of Empire Electric. (R. 146,
941.) The mere fact that some of the those who opposed the repurchase and exercised
their rights as citizens to voice that opposition also happened to be employees of Empire
Electric proves nothing. There is no evidence establishing any kind of link between their
actions and the company. Moreover, these assertions have nothing to do with the issues
before the Court: whether the City Defendants denied not just the right of the Citizens,
but of all residents of the City, to oppose the proposed purchase. They are a baseless,
groundless personal attack, have nothing to do with the issues and should be disregarded.
Plaintiffs make several assertions in their Statement of Facts apparently in support
of their argument they did not violate the Municipal Bond Act. They claim that
"[b]ecause revenue bonds and general obligation bonds are secured in different manners,
different rules govern their issuance." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 10.) They state,
"Publication of the notice [of intent to issue bonds] was not required by law and the
parameters indicated in the notice and resolution did not bind the issuer
5

" (City

Defendants' Brief, pg. 10.) They argue, "[T]he '30-day contestability period5 for the
Electric Revenue Bonds . . . is not essential to the lawful issuance of the bonds.'" (City
Defendants' Brief, pg. 11, emphasis in original.) Each of these assertions are legal
arguments and should be disregarded as statements of fact. As explained more fully in
the Argument section below, these arguments are wrong.
The City Defendants next claim "all of the Electric Revenue Bonds approved by
Resolution 2000-3 could be issued tax-exempt and at interest rates significantly below the
conventional rates for taxable obligations." (City Defendants' Brief, pgs. 11-12,
emphasis in original.) None of the three portions of the record the City Defendants cite
support this claim. They establish only that the City would lose the tax-exempt status it
had for $1 million of the $2.3 million the City planned to bond. The record below
confirms the remaining $1.3 million did not qualify for tax exempt status. (R. at 1049,
pg. 4, ^| 12.) Because these facts are contrary to the record, they should be disregarded.
The City Defendants claim that as they pursued a short-term line of credit to
alternatively finance the proposed purchase, the "City Council discussed this funding
option at length in work meetings that were noticed and open to the public." The City
Defendants offer no support for this assertion in the record. The record is, in fact, directly
to the contrary. The evidence before the trial court was that City Council member Trent
Schaffer investigated this type of alternative funding without seeking the approval of the
City Council in a formal City Council meeting. (R. at 1049, pg. 4, ^ 14.) Because this
fact is contrary to the record, it should be disregarded by the Court.
6

The City Defendants assert in their Statement of Facts that they informed residents
submitting the proposed purchase to the public for a vote would be "improper." (City
Defendants' Brief, pg. 15.) The portion of the record they cite, however, only states the
opinion the City Defendants were not "legally required" to submit the issue to a vote.
While this misrepresentation about what the record says is minor, it is one of the many
examples of citations the City Defendants make to the record that do not support the facts
claimed, many much more serious. In addition to those cited above, the City Defendants
state in a footnote that "a majority of residents support the repurchase." (City
Defendants' Brief, pg. 16 n.6.) Whether the residents supported the repurchase is not the
issue. The issue is whether the purchase should have been submitted for a vote. Second,
the portion of the record they cite in support of this assertion does not support the claim.
It is a citation to the City Council's minutes and does not contain the assertion anywhere
in those minutes. Consequently, these facts should be disregarded.
For these reasons, the Court should use the Citizens' Statement of Facts in
analyzing the issues.
ARGUMENT
The City Defendants argue, "The claims asserted in the Verified Complaint differ
drastically from the arguments asserted on appeal." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 18 n.7.)
They fail, however, to present any evidence that any of the issues the Citizens raise on
appeal were not preserved below. Consequently, their implication that there is no basis
for the Citizens' arguments is without merit.
7

I.

THE REFERENDUM CLAIM IS NOT TIME BARRED.

The City Defendants argue the proposed referendum is time barred because the
Citizens did not apply to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ within ten days
after the City refused to hold the referendum. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 28.) The City
Defendants' argument fails for several reasons. First, it requires a finding that pursuing
an extraordinary writ is the only means by which voters may compel a referendum. The
City Defendants fail to present any support for their argument. That is because there is
none. Prior to 1994, there was "nothing in the statutes governing direct legislation
[which] explicitly provide[d] a remedy for denial of a[] [referendum] application . . . "
Bigler v. Vernon, 858 P.2d 1390, 1393, (Utah 1993). The accepted means of seeking a
referendum vote was through a mandamus action. Id. In 1994, the Legislature enacted
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601, et seq., which requires voters seeking to obtain a
referendum vote to file an application for a referendum petition with the local clerk (Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-7-602); obtain the requisite number of signatures (§ 20A-7-601(l));
and file the petition with the local clerk within 35 days after the passage of the local law
(§ 20A-7-601(3)). There is no dispute the Citizens met all three requirements.
Once these conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts to the local clerk to verify the
signatures, indicate whether the number of signatures is sufficient to submit the matter to
a vote and notify at lease one of the sponsors of the conclusion. Utah Code Ann. § 20 A7-607. There is no dispute the county clerk certified the numbers of signatures as
sufficient for a referendum and that the City Attorney even went so far as to prepare the
8

ballot title. (R. at 594.) However, by letter dated June 29, 2000, the City informed the
Citizens it would not hold a referendum election (R. at 594.) It is at that point that § 20A7-607 gives referendum petitioners the option to file an extraordinary writ. It states, "If
the local clerk refuses to accept and file any referendum petition, any voter may apply to
the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so . . . " Utah Code Ann.
§ 20A-7-607. Nowhere does the Legislature state that the extraordinary writ is a
petitioner's only remedy. It states if the voter chooses to pursue relief through an
extraordinary writ, the application for such must be filed "within ten days after the
refusal." Id. There is nothing that prohibits a petitioner from seeking a referendum
through a mandamus action. If that is the chosen course of action, the 10-day limitation
for the extraordinary writ would not apply. When the City Defendants filed a
counterclaim against the Citizens seeking a declaration they were not required to conduct
a referendum, they put the mandamus issue squarely before the trial court and that is the
course the referendum issue has taken. Consequently, the 10-day limitation period
imposed by § 20A-7-607 for extraordinary writs does not apply.
Even if it did, the referendum claim is not time barred. As stated above, the City
informed the Citizens on June 29, 2000 it would not be submitting the proposed purchase
for a referendum vote. Accordingly, the clock for the ten-day period would have began to
run on June 29, 2000 at the earliest. Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
"In computing any period of time prescribed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the
a c t . . . shall not be included . . . When the period of time prescribed or allowed . . . is less
9

than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the
computation." Rule 6(a), Ut. R. Civ. P. Under this calculation, the mandamus claim
would have been due June 13, 2000. Rule 6 also states, "Whenever a party has the right
or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period." Rule 6(e), Ut. R. Civ. P. Under this
calculation, the claim would have been due July 12, 2000.
As explained above, the City Defendants brought the referendum issue before the
trial court by filing its counterclaim on July 12, 2000. When that happened, there was no
longer any need for the Citizens to seek a writ from the Supreme Court. The issue
became a matter to be decided by the trial court. That was done within the 10-day period
calculated under Rule 6. This, coupled with the general rule that the law authorizing
initiative legislation receives a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose and all doubts
as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedure are to
be resolved in favor of the accomplishment of that purpose, Cope v. Toronto, 332 P.2d
977 (1958), demonstrates the City Defendants' argument the referendum is time barred is
erroneous.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE CITY'S DECISION TO PURCHASE THE SYSTEM
WAS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTEAD OF LEGISLATIVE.

The City Defendants acknowledge in their brief that the only remaining issue on
the referendum claim is whether the decision to purchase the system was legislative or
10

administrative. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 31.) They concede that if the decision was
legislative, it is subject to a referendum. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 31.) They of course
argue the decision was administrative. For the reasons stated below, as well as in the
Citizens' opening brief, the undisputed material facts establish the decision was
administrative and, therefore, subject to a referendum.
The City Defendants acknowledge the Utah Supreme Court considers the
following factors primary in determining whether an act is administrative or legislative:
whether the action "is ministerial or temporary in character," so as to be administrative, or
"prescribes a permanent rule of conduct of government," making it legislative. Keigley /,
63 P.2d at 265. (City Defendants' Brief, pgs. 34-35). They completely ignore those
factors, however, in their analysis. They fail to explain anywhere in their brief how the
facts establish their decision to purchase the system was administrative under this
controlling test. Instead, they rely heavily on the distinction between making new law
and acting pursuant to existing law, set forth in Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah
1939) (Keigley II), and three other factors adopted by courts from other jurisdictions. The
facts of record in this case establish the City Defendants' actions were legislative under
those factors as well.
A.

Creation of New Law

The City Defendants argue, "[T]he option allowing the City 'to repurchase the
electrical system' . . . was an independent legislative act taken by the City Council acting
in its legislative capacity." (City Defendants' Brief, pgs. 37-38.) They continue,
11

"Resolution 2000-2 . . . made no new law but rather executed an option . . . preserved and
plainly contemplated." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 38.) This argument is erroneous.
As explained in the Citizens' opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court addressed
this very issue in Keigley v. Bench, 63 P.2d 262 (Utah 1936) ("Keigley 7"), a case with
facts nearly identical to those here. In Keigley I, Provo City passed a resolution
authorizing it to purchase $800,000 in revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring an
electric power distribution system. Id. at 263-64. When the City refused to conduct a
referendum, the citizens filed a mandamus action to compel one. Id. at 264. The court
rejected the city's argument the resolution was administrative, reasoning it was calculated
to bind the city to contract for or purchase an electric lighting and power system and to
operate the system until the bonds were paid. Id. That, the court stated, was essentially
legislative in character and, therefore, subject to a referendum vote. Id.
Keigley I demonstrates the proposed purchase in this case was legislative. The
City Defendants attempt to distinguish Keigley I by arguing the court's holding was dicta
because the resolution to purchase the system in that case was subsequently repealed.
(City Defendants' Brief, pg. 39 n.17.) While true, had the Keigley /court not intended its
statements to bind future decisions, it would have summarily disposed of the issue instead
of explaining in detail the differences between administrative and legislative functions.
Consequently, this argument is without merit.
The City Defendants next attempt to distinguish Keigley I by arguing the
"legislative 'end' that [the court concluded] 'was a matter of pubic policy of vital
12

importance' (id) was the providing of electricity." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 39.)
That is not what Keigley I says. The court clearly declared the City's decision to
purchase the electric distribution system and the means used to pay for it was a legislative
action. Keigley I, 63 P.2d at 265. It stated, "[T]he resolution of May 22, 1936," in which
the city agreed to purchase the system, "was a legislative action. It was calculated to bind
Provo City to contract for or purchase an electric lighting and power system and to
operate the same until the revenue bonds were paid. The accomplishment of that end was
a matter of public policy of vital importance to the inhabitants of the city and as such is
essentially legislative in character." Id. (emphasis added). That language clearly
demonstrates the steps the city took to accomplish the end of providing electricity purchasing the system and issuing bonds to pay for the purchase - were legislative
actions. Id. Contrary to the City Defendants' assertions, Keigley I is directly on point
and in favor of the Citizens' position that a referendum is required.
The City Defendants cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions (City
Defendants' Brief, pgs. 40-43, 42 n.18) attempting to show the "exercise of an option is
an administrative act." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 40.) All of those cases, however,
involve the purchase of real property, which is nothing like the proposed purchase in this
case. Those cases, which conclude the exercise of options to purchase real property are
administrative in nature and therefore not subject to a referendum, are based on the
determination that purchases of real property are not "permanent" in nature "because
upon completion of the transaction 'the ordinance in question will be practically
13

defunct.'" (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 41, quoting Monahan v. Funk, 3 P.2d 778, 780
(Or. 1931). The City's proposed purchase of the electric distribution system, however,
will be ongoing until the City decides to sell it. The City will be responsible for the dayto-day operations of running an ongoing business providing electricity to the City's
residents. By passing the resolution authorizing the purchase, the City Council was not
merely carrying out a predetermined course of action. Instead, it was making the
significant policy determination of a "permanent or general character" that the City
should purchase a system, make the requisite budget expenditures to carry out the
purchase and dedicate the necessary time and personnel to not only carry out the purchase
but administer the system thereafter. The City does not now own and operate its own
electric distribution system, which is the activity the City Council has now voted to
undertake. The City's responsibilities will not terminate upon completion of the
transaction but will only be beginning and will continue until the City decides, if ever, to
sell the system. That is certainly permanent in nature. Consequently, the cases the City
Defendants cite do not apply to the facts of this case.
As demonstrated above, and in the Citizens' opening brief, the City Defendants'
proposed purchase indeed amounts to the creation of a new law, not merely the execution
of an existing one. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of a conclusion the
proposed purchase was legislative and, therefore, subject to a referendum.

14

B.

Ways and Means of Providing for Purpose

The City Defendants argue the proposed purchase "does not 'declare [a] public
purpose and provide a ways and means to accomplish that purpose,' but rather 'deals with
a small segment of an overall policy question.'" (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 43,
alteration in original, quoting Wichita v. Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d 667, 67272 (Kansas 1994)). This argument is absurd. It is undisputed that the Utah Constitution
empowers cities to provide utility services to its citizens and gives them great latitude in
determining how best to fulfill that duty. That is the purpose of the City's decision to
purchase the electric distribution system: to itself provide power to the City's residents
instead of contracting with another entity to do so. Actually purchasing the system in
order to provide power to City residents is certainly the method - the ways and means - of
achieving that purpose. These decisions were not made "long ago," as argued by the City
Defendants. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 44.) The 1979 ordinance they claim made that
decision only gave them the option to repurchase the system for fair market value if they
chose to do so. The decision to repurchase the system occurred when the City enacted
Resolution 2000-2 declaring it would exercise the option.
As demonstrated above, the City Defendants' proposed purchase constitutes the
ways and means of carrying out a public policy, not merely a confirmation of an existing
policy. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that the proposed
purchase was legislative and, therefore, subject to a referendum.

15

C.

Requirement of Specialized Training and Knowledge

The City Defendants argue the proposed purchase is not legislative "because an
'intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other affairs of [the] [C]ity' was necessary 'in order
to make a rational choice.'" (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 44, alterations in original,
quoting Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d at 672-72.) This is simply not true. There
is no reason - or evidence for that matter - the City residents were incapable of making an
informed decision about the proposed purchase had the City Defendants presented them
with information about the benefits and burdens of purchasing the system. They simply
feared that by doing so, the residents would reject the proposed purchase. The City
Defendants' argument that the government knows what is best for the people even if the
people don't want it is the dangerous type of thinking against which the referendum
process was designed to protect. The course the City Defendants pursued is contrary to
the fundamental premise upon which this country and this state were founded - that
lawmakers derive their power from the just consent of the governed and have a
responsibility to act in a manner consistent with the will of the people, even if contrary to
their own position.
The City Defendants' argument that allowing a referendum on the proposed
purchase would "' impair the efficient administration of the municipality . . . " is utterly
lacking in support. (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 44, quoting Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d
251, 253.) There is no evidence in the record supporting this claim and the City
Defendants fail to cite any. Even if there were factual support for the argument, it is
16

nevertheless faulty. The City had 20 years to decide whether it wanted to repurchase the
system or not and, indeed, began evaluating the proposed purchase in 1997. (R. at 11819, ^f 3.) It had plenty of time to obtain the information, present it to the public and
submit it for a vote without disrupting the asserted "time-sensitive transaction[]." (City
Defendants' Brief, pg. 45.) Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that
the proposed purchase was legislative and, therefore, subject to a referendum.
D.

Full Nature of Action

The City Defendants argue that "the right of initiative and referendum 'is restricted
to measures which are quite clearly and fully legislative' in nature." (City Defendants'
Brief, pg. 45, quoting Kansas Taxpayers Network, 874 P.2d at 671-72.) It concludes,
"[T]he resolution's administrative nature clearly predominates." (City Defendants' Brief,
pg. 45.) As fully explained above, the undisputed material facts that comprise the record
demonstrate the decision to purchase the system was clearly and fully legislative in
nature. Consequently, a referendum is required and the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the contrary should be reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT SUBMITTING THE ISSUE TO THE PUBLIC FOR A
REFERENDUM VOTE WOULD VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES
AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.

The City Defendants argue in their opposition brief, as they did below, that even if
the decision to purchase the system was legislative, an election is still not appropriate
because it would violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions.
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The Citizens explained in their opening brief that Resolution 2000-2 creates no legal
obligations by the City to Empire Electric because the only contract in effect between
them is the Contract dated May 12, 2000. It states:
If a REFERENDUM election relating to the purchase of the SYSTEM is held,
either as a result of the judicial disposition or by agreement of the parties to the
LITIGATION, and . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is upheld, then the closing shall be scheduled for 60 days from the date of
the election; or . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is rescinded, and/or the citizens vote that the City shall not purchase the
SYSTEM, then EMPIRE'S franchise under Ordnance 79-11 shall be extended for
20 years subject pursuant to Ordinance 79-11.
(Contract, Tf 3.)
The Contract expressly provides that if the City cannot purchase the system as a
result of a referendum election, the owner's franchise would be renewed for another 20
years. Because the agreement between the City and the owner contains a provision which
would not subject the City to damages if the purchase could not be completed because of
the results of a referendum election, there can be no impairment of contract under the
Contract Clauses of either the United States or Utah Constitutions by holding one.
Moreover, even if the results of a referendum election did expose the City to a
claim by the owner for breach of contract, the City should not be allowed to execute a
contract inconsistent with its statutory obligations and contrary to the will of the people
and then hide behind that contract to bind the citizens to a purchase they may not wish to
undertake. To allow such a result would undermine the very purpose of the referendum
process: to ensure governmental actions are not made against the will of the people.
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The City Defendants fail to address these arguments altogether. As explained
above, there is simply no evidence to support their argument they are contractually bound
to complete the transaction or they will be in breach. Consequently, the trial court's
conclusion that allowing a referendum would violate the Contract Clauses of the United
States and Utah Constitutions is erroneous and should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE CITY DEFENDANTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
MUNICIPAL BOND ACT.

There is no dispute the City initially attempted to finance the purchase of the
system with revenue bonds. The Citizens claim the City Defendants violated the
Municipal Bond Act by misrepresenting to City residents the principal and interest
necessary to finance the purchase. The City Defendants make two arguments in support
of their position they did not violate the Municipal Bond. Both are erroneous.
A.

Issuance of the Notice is Mandatory

The City Defendants first argue that "publication of a notice of intent to issue
bonds is completely optional under the statute [Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21]" and that the
Citizens "cite absolutely no authority for their contrary assertion." (City Defendants'
Brief, pg. 19, emphasis in original.) Both of these allegations are untrue.
The Citizens explain in detail in their opening memorandum that § 11-14-21,
which governs the issuance of such bonds, requires notice. It states:
In case of a resolution or other proceeding providing for the issuance of
bonds, the governing body may, in lieu of publishing the entire resolution or
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other proceeding, publish a notice of bonds to be issued, titled as such,
containing:
(a) the name of the issuer;
(b) the purpose of the issue;
(c) the type of bonds and the maximum principal amount which may
be issued;
(d) the maximum number of years over which the bonds may
mature;
(e) the maximum interest rate which the bonds may bear, if any;
(f) the maximum discount from par, expressed as a percentage of
principal amount, at which the bands may be sold; and
(g) the times and place where a copy of the resolution or other
proceeding may be examined, which shall be at an office of the
issuer, identified in the notice, during regular business hours of the
issuer as described in the notice and for a period of at least 30 days
after the publication of the notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21(3).
The Citizens do not cite any case law in support of the argument notice is
mandatory because there is none. There is also no authority supporting the City
Defendants' argument the notice is optional. While there is no case law addressing this
issue, there is ample support for the Citizens' argument that notice was mandatory. The
express language of the statute makes the notice mandatory. It states the City may "in
lieu of publishing the entire resolution" publish a notice of intent. In other words, it
requires the City to publish either the resolution or a notice of intent. The publication of
at least one is mandatory. The only option is which one. Because the City Defendants
did not publish the entire resolution, the notice was mandatory.
Even if the notice were optional, it did not excuse the City Defendants from
publishing inaccurate information about the principal and interest of the proposed bonds.
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By "choosing" to publish the information, the City Defendants were obligated to disclose
accurate information. They violated the Municipal Bond Act when they failed to do so.
The City Defendants themselves recognize this when they state, "[I]f the bonds ultimately
issued are not consistent with the publication . . . the bond would be subject to challenge
by voters like Plaintiffs [the Citizens]." (City Defendants' Brief, pg. 22.) That is exactly
the situation here and the basis for the Citizens' Municipal Bond Act claim.
Consequently, there is no basis for the argument that "if the bonds ultimately issued are
not consistent with the publication, the bond issue still is valid." (City Defendants' Brief,
pg. 22, emphasis in original.) Inaccurate information renders the bonds invalid.
B.

Terms of the Bond Were Not Accurate

The City Defendants next argue the notice was accurate because it "recounted
terms projected for the bonds in the parameters resolution." (City Defendants' Brief, pg.
23, emphasis in original.) There is no dispute the City's notice of its intent stated the
interest rate for the bonds would be no greater than 6.75% and the total amount bonded
would be $2.78 million. The City Defendants assert in their brief that all of the bonds
they intended to issue qualify as tax exempt and that the tax-exempt interest rate was
6.37%, which was less than the highest projected rate of 6.75%. The record, however,
establishes that only $1.48 million of the $2.3 million the City intended to issue bonds for
would qualify for the 6.75% interest rate. The remaining $1.3 million would be subject to
a higher interest rate, which also would have increased the principal amount bonded. The
portion of the record they cite that they claim supports the 6.37% rate for the total amount
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states that only exempt bonds qualify for the 6.37% rate and that taxable bonds will have
an interest rate of 7.94%. The undisputed evidence is that $1.3 million of the total the
City intended to bond did not qualify for the exempt status and therefore was subject to
the 7.94% rate. It is clear from these facts that the City misrepresented to its residents in
the notice the maximum interest rate and maximum principal amount of the bonds.
Consequently, they violated the Municipal Bond Act by attempting to issue bonds
inconsistent with the notice.
The City Defendants also argue they did not violate the Municipal Bond Act
because they acted in good faith in attempting to comply with its terms. Therefore, any
discrepancies in the notice were of no consequence. (City Defendants' Brief, pgs. 22-23.)
This argument is erroneous for two reasons. First, their argument is premised upon the
assertion that "voluntary publication of a notice will not bind the issuer to terms . .."
(City Defendants' Brief, pg. 21.) The City Defendants offer no legal support for this
assertion. Moreover, the "facts" they argue in support (i.e., unpredictability of final
terms) are not a part of the record. Consequently, they cannot be considered on appeal.
Second, the evidence in the record demonstrates they did not act in good faith.
When the City Defendants learned they could not issue the revenue bonds in time to
complete the transaction by the desired closing date, they attempted to obtain alternative
financing with Zion's bank without going through the proper procedures. Those
arrangements were all done without the public's knowledge and in violation of Utah Code
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Ann. § 10-7-16, which is more fully discussed in the Citizens' opening memorandum.
The City Defendants fail to respond to this argument.
The undisputed material facts in the record establish the City Defendants violated
the Municipal Bond Act. Consequently, the trial court's conclusion to the contrary
should be reversed.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY CONCLUDING AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT VARIOUS PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES
BARRED THE CITIZENS' ATTEMPT TO ENJOIN THE CITY
DEFENDANTS FROM VIOLATING THE MUNICIPAL BOND ACT.

The City Defendants do not contest the Citizens' assertion the trial court erred in
concluding the City Defendants are immune from such claims under the Governmental
Immunity Act, § 63-30-1, tt seq., and that the Citizens lack standing to assert such a
claim. They only contend the Municipal Bond Act claim is not ripe. They assert the
Citizens "attack terms of bonds that are still just hypothetical." (City Defendants' Brief,
pg. 26, emphasis in original, footnote omitted). They are wrong.
As explained in the Citizens' opening memorandum, "Ripeness occurs when 'a
conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual or
imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto.'" Boyle v.
National Union Fire Ins, Co,, 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Redwood
Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm % 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)) (alteration in
original). The City Defendants' violation of the Municipal Bond Act was complete when
they published the notice to issue bonds which was inconsistent with the terms on which
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the closing was set to occur. Consequently, the Citizens' claim under the Municipal Bond
Act is ripe and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in their opening memorandum, the
Citizens respectfully request that the Court reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City, reverse the trial court's denial of the Citizens' cross-motion
for summary judgment and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of
the Citizens, declaring that the purchase of the system is a legislative act, the referendum
is required to be placed on the ballot in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-102(3)
and the City is enjoined in the purchase until such time as the referendum vote is tallied
and results are certified in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-610.
DATED this ^ 5 ^ day of November, 2001.
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